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Abstract: Internet social media sites enable the rapid and widespread production and 
dissemination of propaganda. Although propaganda has a long history in warfare, the 
spreading of propaganda via social media is markedly different from past distribution 
methods. The authors investigated the relationships between state-affiliated actors who use 
social media to produce and distribute propaganda and their national cultural values. The 
results showed that countries that deployed fake news via social media tended to have more 
masculine cultural values. These findings suggest that specific cultural values are associated 
with fake news distribution, which may indicate that culturally aware responses may be more 
effective in responding to propaganda. 
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Introduction 
The U.S. political events of 2016 brought to the forefront concerns about mass information 
operation campaigns and their effects, particularly the social and political effects of 
propaganda. The use of social media to produce and to deliver propaganda represents a new, 
low-cost, rapid, and more effective mechanism for furthering the persuasive goals of state 
actors. Lee and Kent (2017) noted that approximately one third of the U.S. population 
received Russian propaganda on Facebook during the 2016 election cycle. Gottfried and 
Shearer (2016) found that, in 2016, a majority of U.S. citizens used social media sites as a 
news source. 
 
Social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter were not initially designed or envisioned as 
primary news sources. An examination of their mission statements shows these sites were 
envisioned as communications’ enabling forums. The original mission statement for Twitter 
reads as follows: “To give everyone the power to create and share ideas and information 
instantly, without barriers” (Fox 2014). Facebook’s original mission statement says that 
“Facebook’s mission is to give people the power to share and make the world more open and 
 
 
connected” (Facebook n.d.). In 2017, Facebook updated its mission statement: to “Give 
people the power to build community and bring the world closer together” (Facebook 2019). 
In each of these statements, the mission does not mention news sharing or, for that matter, 
information or knowledge sharing. However, in retrospect, a communications medium, 
particularly a synchronous medium, is a tempting target for deceptive data, especially since 
the target can provide immediate feedback for the purveyor. 
 
The social media environment as a news dissemination paradigm differs from the original 
news paradigm for print and broadcast, in which control of production and dissemination of 
news was concentrated to a small group of broadcasters who were granted licenses to operate 
from their governments. However, social media sites with the ability to ‘like’ and ‘share’ 
information or stories creates an environment that appears as news, and is now able to spread 
without controls. This unconventional use of social media sites as primary news sites 
suggests that the adoption patterns associated with these information-shaping behaviours may 
differ from the adoption patterns associated with social media usage in general. Sample and 
Karamanian (2014) observed collectivism, indulgence, and short-term orientation with 
Facebook adoption rates, whereas Twitter adoption was associated with masculine and 
indulgent values. 
 
Although social media sites may not have originally been envisioned as news media, the 
recognition of the value of social media sites (such as Twitter) as news sources grew during 
and after the Arab spring (Howard & Hussain 2011; Comunello & Anzera 2012). During the 
Arab Spring, Twitter feeds from affected Middle East countries produced a narrative that 
countered the official government versions of events (Howard & Hussain 2011; Comunello & 
Anzera 2012) and that provided accurate images of events that were officially unavailable. At 
this point in time, perception of social media sites had changed from social conversation 
platforms to trusted news sources. 
 
In 2017, Bradshaw & Howard compiled a list of countries where active engagement in 
propaganda via social media spread, as well as the dissemination methods for each country. 
This list, consisting of 29 countries provides the launching point for this study and analysis. 
When examining this list of 29 countries in the context of cultural observations of social 
media usage (see Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkov 2010; Sample & Karamanian 2014), the 
movement from information seeking to information shaping on social media appears to be a 
logical next step. This exploratory study was performed with the purpose of determining 
whether cultural values might be associated with some of the behaviours and trends 
associated with the use of social media sites for production and creation of propaganda. 
 
Background 
Propaganda and deception have a long history in warfare (Shultz 1989; Taylor 2013); 
however, in the past, the distribution or reach was limited (Crilley 2001) by the media--for 
example, through person-to-person communication, newspapers and other printed materials, 
radio, and television. The reach of these sources is now less effective due to speed and cost. 
More recently, Commin and Filiol (2015) noted the breakdown of the traditional boundaries 
of war along with a movement away from the model of bending the enemy to one’s will 
(Chacon 2006) to a different goal of having the victim carry out the attack against themselves 
(Cybenko, Giani & Thompson 2002). In this new age of hybrid warfare propaganda, a form 
of deception is a natural weapon for use in perception shaping which is necessary for victims’ 
self-attack. 
 
 
 
An important step in the process of having targeted audiences enact attacker goals relies on 
whether the message is able to reach the target. In the global virtual environment, much 
attention is given to the reachability and vulnerabilities of various technologies; however, the 
reachability and vulnerabilities of the human are equally important (Szfranski 1997; Franke 
2015). Some countries have mitigated this vulnerability by controlling the reachability of its 
citizens (Clayton, Murdoch & Watson 2006; Aryan, Aryan & Halderman 2013), but the 
directly reachable citizens of many Western democracies remain open to persuasion through 
propaganda. 
 
Propaganda is information or ideas that are spread by an organised group or government to 
influence people’s opinions, especially by not giving all the facts or by secretly emphasising 
only one way of looking at the facts (‘Propaganda’). Fake news is “false stories that appear to 
be news spread on the [I]nternet or using other media, usually created to influence political 
views or as a joke” (‘Fake news’). Both definitions have overlapping features, most notably 
the goal of influencing or persuading and the use of the Internet as a distribution channel. The 
term ‘fake news’ has become so common that the 2017 issue of the Oxford Dictionary of 
English identifies the phrase as the word of the year (Meza 2017). The manner in which war 
is waged in the cyber domain challenges assumptions about cyber space, the entities in cyber 
space, and the relationship between those entities. Some countries’ highly effective 
deployment of deception techniques through the use of propaganda challenges some 
traditionally held beliefs, while the sophistication also continues to grow. 
 
There are several aspects to consider when discussing the role of social media in the 
production and spread of state-sponsored propaganda, and these range from technical to 
operational to behavioural. This study is focused on the behavioural aspects of propaganda, 
specifically trust-exploiting behaviours. Some societal values appear to encourage a degree of 
trust or openness (Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkov 2010). In 2017, specific societal values 
associated with higher victimisation rates through social engineering were observed, which 
suggests that some cultures might be more trusting in the online environment than others 
(Sample et al. 2017). If cultural values are associated with a willingness to trust online 
messages, then these same cultural values may also be associated with the production and 
dissemination of crafted messaging as a part of social media manipulation in support of 
propaganda. 
 
Social media manipulation 
The use of Facebook and Twitter for purposes not listed in the sites’ mission statement 
illustrate the changing nature of social media sites. Facebook and Twitter have become 
launching points and prominent spread sites for fake news. Cultural differences have been 
observed in societal use and interactions with technology (Elmasry, Auter & Peuchaud 2014). 
This variance appears to be consistent with previous research and observations (Hofstede, 
Hofstede & Minkov 2010; Sample & Karamanian 2014; Sample, Cowley & Hutchinson 
2017; Sample et al. 2017), suggesting that national cultural values may be associated with 
propaganda production, spread, and even the method of dissemination when social media has 
been deployed. 
 
Members of open societies that have a protected, independent press may be less familiar with 
media manipulation than those from closed societies with a long history of government-
controlled messaging. Combining this background with the changing nature of social media 
sites as news sharing sites (Gottfried & Shearer 2016), the open-society content readers have 
no reason to distrust the material that they are receiving. Furthermore, when social media 
 
 
sites became sources of truthful news, the subscribers could view the sites as credible sources 
of news stories, even after the quality of the content has changed. 
 
One reason for this unanticipated use of social media for fake news activities may be 
explained by behavioural traits or cultural values associated with the actors in this arena. The 
willingness of the target actors to trust both users and computers as sources of information 
requires a deeper understanding of the nature of online trust relationships. Trusting behaviour 
entails the individual’s surrendering control over valuable outcomes, with the expectation that 
the other will reciprocate. Furthermore, a shared social group identity is a strong predictor of 
trusting behaviour between individuals (Tanis & Postmes 2005). With online trust, Friedman, 
Khan, Jr., and Howe (2000) highlighted that, regarding technology, the term ‘trust’ is often 
broadly used to refer to expectations rather than a considered trusting behaviour as described 
above. They concluded that people trust other people, not technology (Friedman, Khan, Jr & 
Howe 2000). It has been argued that trust can also be considered in terms of how much risk 
and uncertainty individuals are willing to accept, including in their interactions with online 
systems (Jones & Moncur 2018). Context is also significant: people are less trusting of 
situations involving their financial information as opposed to their other personal 
information. This disclosure suggests that the potential manipulation of individuals may be 
easier when finances are not involved. The existence of cognitive heuristics and biases may 
further influence the degree to which people believe and trust fake news. Exploitation of 
these processes allows fake news creators to optimise the target and subsequently spread the 
fake news item. People are likely to deem reliable and trustworthy information that confirms 
their pre-existing beliefs, which is known as the confirmation bias (Kahneman, Slovic & 
Tversky 1982). This is a reflection of the use of heuristics in decision making. The term 
‘heuristics’ refers to the use of mental shortcuts individuals employ in order to reduce the 
cognitive load that would otherwise be required to make complex decisions (Kahneman, 
Slovic & Tversky 1982). Social media can deliver news at high intensity; it is perhaps only to 
be expected that, in order to cope with this intensity, individuals are more likely to employ 
heuristics when judging these news items than when they are using more traditional 
mediums. Such processes may be actively targeted and exploited by the creators of fake 
news. For instance the representativeness heuristic (Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky 1982) 
refers to the tendency to attribute characteristics to something if it matches the preconceived 
prototype of a category. In the case of a fake news story, this equates to the use of a website 
design style that mirrors that used by the websites of established print newspapers, in order to 
convince the reader of the legitimacy of the source. It has been suggested that there is a 
relationship between cultural values and the use of heuristics. For example, it has been noted 
that there are difference in the use of the representativeness heuristic between Canadian and 
Chinese participants (Spina et al. 2010). 
 
Once the trust relationship between the reader and the content provider is in place, 
information shaping and distribution are possible. Considering the competitive nature of 
masculine societies along with the unrestricted boundaries of hybrid warfare, social media 
sites that act as news sources are reasonable targets. According to Hofstede, Hofstede & 
Minkov (2010), competitive, masculine societies will use social media sites for news 
information seeking as a way to gain a competitive advantage, whereas feminine societies 
will use social media sites for social information sharing (Sample & Karamanian 2014). The 
migration of social media sites from information seeking to information shaping represents 
the next frontier and is now known as the fifth domain of war (Lynn 2010). Lee and Kent 
(2017) report that Facebook discovered that 120 fake, Russian-backed pages made 80,000 
posts that went directly to 29 million Facebook users who ‘liked’ and ‘shared’ information 
 
 
with 126M users (Lee & Kent 2017). Twitter was also used in the same manner (Booth et al. 
2017). 
 
Another new aspect is the automated distribution channel or the reliance on bots. The use of 
bots as an automated distribution channel is unique to war in the cyber domain. Considering 
that bots are a relatively young technology (Stinson & Mitchell 2007), their use can also be 
considered as a form of technology adoption. Bot usage also represents an example of the 
21st-century adaptation to the delivery of the fake news payload that was deemed trustworthy 
by the recipients that reached a large population. Bots are also capable of quickly gaining the 
target’s trust through the use of artificial intelligence that can model its responses by the 
inputs that it receives. Thus, the bot that is designed to anger the target will put forth phrases 
that match the target’s values and fears. These programs work by probabilistic predictions 
and, in some cases, have gone rogue in their responses based on the inputs received (Neff & 
Nagy 2016). While this study does not address chatbots specifically, the behavioural aspects 
shaped by both humans and machines are of interest and deserve mention. 
 
Values 
Cultural values as defined by Hofstede are composed of six dimensions: Power Distance 
Index (PDI), Individualism versus Collectivism (IvC), Feminine versus Masculine (FvM), 
Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI), Long-term versus Short-term orientation (LvS), and 
Indulgence versus Restraint (IvR). A brief discussion of each of these dimensions follows. 
 
• PDI—This dimension details an authoritarian or egalitarian society’s ideals. Power in 
the high PDI society originates at the top, suggesting that trust relationships may 
occur among peers or when lower societal members rely on higher members; previous 
observations noted that senior members provide protection to the junior members of 
their group (Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkov 2010; Nisbett 2010). In egalitarian 
societies where “truth is spoken to power” (Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkov 2010), trust 
may likely be more easily granted across a wider population where the ‘in group’ and 
‘out group’ are perceived as being closer in the low PDI societies (Nisbett 2010). In 
low PDI societies, risks tend to be rewarded (Guess 2004; Hofstede, Hofstede & 
Minkov 2010). Propaganda emanating from high authoritarian groups should contain 
a disciplined message that is supported at all levels of society. The spread of fake 
news within low versus high PDI cultures may also be determined by how secret that 
information is. This refers to the secrecy heuristic, where there is a tendency to 
perceive information as being more credible if that information is framed as being 
something that the individual is not meant to know (Travers, Van Boven & Judd 
2014). The revelation of ‘shocking’ information is oftentimes the basis of fake news 
stories, such as those stories during the 2016 U.S. presidential election claiming that 
candidate Clinton had suffered a heart attack (Gillin 2017). In high PDI cultures, this 
secrecy heuristic effect could be enhanced, because there may be a greater assumption 
that those in power are privy to information that is unknown to the general public. 
 
• IvC—This dimension defines a societal individual’s view of self as related to the 
larger society. Collectivist societies view the individual as an important link in a 
larger chain (Nisbett 2010). The implication for social media manipulation is that 
collectivist values might result in greater consistency, whereas individualist societies 
might exhibit less consistency but greater breadth in the spread mechanisms. 
 
 
 
• FvM—This dimension defines the manner in which a society deals with conflict, with 
masculine societies dealing directly and seeking a solution where winners and losers 
are present, whereas feminine societies seek to negotiate so that each side wins. 
 
• UAI—This dimension focuses on how a society deals with the unknown. The high 
UAI society needs assurance in order to accept what is unknown, whereas in the low 
UAI society curiosity overrules fear. This relates to predictability of the environment. 
A culture with low UAI may be less likely to pay attention to a fake news story that 
depicts a deviation from social norms. On the other hand, cultures with high UAI may 
be especially sensitive to any fake news story that indicates a breach of a social norm, 
because this in turn suggests greater uncertainty. This is in keeping with 
psychological research that suggests people are particularly influenced by information 
that does not match their preconceptions (Hemsley & Marmurek 1982). The high UAI 
societies may be drawn to shape information with precision and consistency. 
 
• LvS—This dimension defines a societal preference for immediate rewards versus 
waiting for gratification. This relates to trust as a long-term culture relies upon 
ongoing, harmonious relationships between individuals if the culture is to survive into 
the future, meaning that agreement between and trust of others is encouraged 
(Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkov 2010). 
 
• IvR—This dimension defines how societal members express themselves and ranges 
from stoic with little to no shows of emotion to large celebrations. 
 
Method 
The examination of culture creates challenges due to the existence of unconscious social and 
cultural biases that everyone possesses (Nosek, Hawkins & Frazier 2011; Fiske & Taylor 
2013). Objectivity, although difficult to attain, is still a primary goal; thus, quantitative 
analysis has advantages. Furthermore, observation of behaviour in a natural setting is 
difficult. In this particular case, the observable data were collected and analysed for a 
different study; the researchers for this study re-used the collected data to determine whether 
common cultural values can be observed. The research questions used are listed below. 
 
• R1: Use of Social Media by Propaganda Purveyors 
Do the purveyors of propaganda who use social media sites differ culturally from 
those who do not? Evaluation of results relies on using the full set of countries that 
Hofstede defined, and dividing the countries into two groups: those who use social 
media sites to deliver propaganda and the remaining countries from the Hofstede pool 
of countries. The two groups will be compared to determine how similar or dissimilar 
they are in terms of distributions using the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon (MWW) test 
(Hollander, Wolfe & Chicken 2013). The researchers are testing against the null 
hypothesis that states H0: There are no differences in the distribution cultural values 
among the purveyors and the non-purveyors. Thus, H1 represents the alternative 
hypothesis that must be considered if p ≤ 0.01, after adjusting for multiple 
comparisons using a Bonferroni adjustment (α/comparisons = 0.05/5 comparisons) 
(Hollander, Wolfe & Chicken 2013). 
 
• R2: Cultural Values over a period of time for Countries with Social Media 
Propaganda Purveyors and without 
 
 
Are there any cultural value trends that can be observed on the social media site 
propaganda purveyors? The second research question can be answered by evaluating 
the median values of purveyor over the seven-year time interval. The median values 
for each year will be paired with the year, and a Spearman correlation will be run 
(Hollander, Wolfe & Chicken 2013). H2: There are no associations between the 
cultural values and social media propaganda distributors vs. non-distributors. H3: 
represents the alternative hypothesis that must be considered, an inferred relationship 
between cultural values and propaganda distributors who use social media. 
 
• R3: Cultural Values and Methods for Social Media Propaganda Delivery 
Do any cultural values associate with the method of propaganda delivery? For this set  
 
1.1.1 Hofstede Cultural Values  
Social 
Media 
Methods Country PDI IvC FvM UAI LvS IvR Years 
1 49 46 56 86 20 62 5 A 
2 36 90 61 51 21 71 4 A 
3 69 38 49 76 44 59 7 B 
4 80 20 66 30 87 24 6 H 
5 57 58 57 74 70 29 0+ Unlisted 
6 78 8 63 67 N/A N/A 3 B 
7 35 67 66 65 83 40 1 A 
8 77 48 56 40 51 26 4 Unlisted 
9 58 41 43 59 14 40 5 A 
10 13 54 47 81 38 N/A 4 Unlisted 
11 81 30 69 82 24 97 0+ B 
12 94 32 64 44 27 42 1 A 
13 68 60 64 93 38 29 2 H 
14 93 39 36 95 81 20 5 B 
15 95 25 60 80 36 52 4 A 
16 86 25 43 92 52 28 0+ H 
17 60 18 39 85 100 29 4 B 
18 80 35 52 60 30 N/A 6 A 
19 58 17 45 69 93 49 7 B 
20 66 37 45 85 49 49 4 B 
21 35 89 66 35 51 69 3 H 
22 40 91 62 46 26 68 6 B 
23 81 12 73 76 16 100 2 B 
24 70 20 40 30 57 35 4 H 
Manipulators 
(median) 
68 37 57 74 41 45.5 N/A N/A 
Control group 
(median) 
69 30 42.5 60 35 47 N/A N/A 
HOFSTEDE 68 30 46 64 38 47 N/A N/A 
Table 1: List of countries that use social media to spread propaganda 
 
of data, the groups are small so that the standard tests of MWW and Spearman are not 
appropriate (Hollander, Wolfe & Chicken 2013). The median values are descriptively 
examined and compared against the overall Hofstede median values, and significant 
differences (greater than 10) will be discussed along with the importance of the result. 
 
 
 
Of the 29 countries listed in the Bradshaw and Howard (2017) study, 24 of the countries were 
found in Hofstede’s data (Hofstede n.d.); countries that were not found in Hofstede’s data 
were excluded. In some cases, the social media methods were not identified, in which case 
those countries were excluded in the methods portion of the study (R3), but they are included 
in the processing for R1 and R2. Table 1, below, provides the listing of countries, their 
Hofstede cultural values, the number of years in the Bradshaw and Howard (2017) study, and 
the methods (A for automated, H for human, and B for both human and automated) used to 
disseminate propaganda. Since the focus of this study is on cultural values, the country names 
are not listed, but the reader can determine the country names through examination of the 
cultural values provided by Hofstede (n.d.). The data used in this study can be found at 
https://sites.google.com/site/cyberbehaviors/study-data. 
 
The hypotheses tested are broken down into six sub-hypotheses for each dimension. 
Evaluation of the overall findings relies on ‘or’ processing of a truth table. A single positive 
or ‘1’ entry in the truth table is sufficient to accept the alternative hypothesis. 
 
Results 
The results of the MWW test used to evaluate R1: H0, H1 can be viewed in Table 2; below; 
the main finding is shown graphically in Figure 1, below; and the corresponding truth table 
results are shown below in Table 3. Significant findings are shown in bold, and interesting 
findings are shown in italics. Tables 4 and 5, also below, contain the findings related to R2: 
H2, H3. Table 6 contains the findings for median value analysis to address R3. This section 
simply lists the results and interpretation; further analysis can be found in the discussion 
section, which follows. 
 
Dimension PDI IvC FvM UAI LvS IvR 
p-value 0.7944 0.4515 0.0078** 0.4978 0.235 0.940 
Table 2:. R1: Social media methods and Hofstede cultural values 
* p < 0.05: Conventional significance level, not corrected for multiple comparisons. 
** p ≤ 0.01: Conventional level for statistical significance after adjusting for multiple comparisons. 
 
 
Figure 1: The x-axis depicts the feminine (0) to masculine (100) cultural value. The y-axis shows whether or 
not the country was a purveyor of social media propaganda (Yes is >50; No is <50). The dotted lines indicate the 
median values. 
 
Dimension PDI IvC FvM UAI LvS IvR 
T/F 0 0 1 0 0 0 
 
 
Table 3: Truth table evaluation for H0, H1 
 
Dimension PDI IvC FvM UAI LvS IvR 
r  0.333 0.142 0.5714** 0.3333 -0.119 0.071 
Table 4: Trended median values H2, H3 
 
Dimension PDI IvC FvM UAI LvS IvR 
T/F 1+ 0 1+ 1+ 0 0 
Table 5: Truth table evaluation for H2, H3 
 
Dimension/Delivery PDI IvC FvM UAI LvS IvR 
Automated 58 41 60 60 27 47 
Human 70 25 64 35 52 29 
Both 73.5 24 47 79 49 49 
HOFSTEDE 
68 30 46 64 38 47 
Table 6: Median values for delivery method groups 
 
Discussion 
Findings for each of the research questions provided evidence that implied a relationship 
between cultural values and the use of social media to disseminate propaganda. Masculine 
values were observed in response to each of the research questions. This finding suggests 
that, in addition to using social media for information seeking, masculine values may play a 
role in the use of social media for information shaping. A breakdown of the findings for each 
research question follows. 
 
R1 involved examination of the propaganda purveyors who used social media. The difference 
between the disseminators and the non-disseminators in FvM dimension is similar to the 
observation of social engineering attackers by Sample et al. (2017), where self-identified 
attackers who deployed social engineering as an attack vector tended as a group to  nationally 
possess masculine values compared to the non-attackers. This result suggests two things: 
first, that for attackers from countries that possess masculine cultural values, data may be 
considered as a tool that can be weaponised; and,second, that truthful data might be less 
valued in these competitive, aggressive societies than in societies with nurturing values. This 
may be because fake news stories often purport to provide information that is somehow 
unexpected or secret, and thus this information appears to offer the individual a competitive 
advantage, which involves the concept that knowledge is power. Another finding of interest 
in the data was the difference between the UAI values. Although not statistically significant, 
this result again supports the findings of the aforementioned study (Sample et al. 2017) in 
which the social engineering attackers were found to have significantly higher UAI values 
than their non-attacking counterparts. With regard to fake news, this could suggest that 
individuals are more likely to trust fake news sources, as to do so avoids uncertainty and 
lowers the perception of risk. In high UAI societies, propaganda may represent an additional 
method to assure mission success. 
 
R2 involved examining the median values of the countries that use social media to 
disseminate propaganda over time. The trend line for masculine values over the 7-year period 
shows an increase. 
These two dimensions are singled out for two reasons: 1) the high FvM associates with 
information seeking and suggests that information shaping may also be a behaviour to 
 
 
associate with this dimension; and 2) the masculine trend, while significant, is not overtly 
masculine; rather the results are centred with a gradual increase reflecting an increasingly 
masculine trend. This finding suggests that, over time, these same countries that have 
historically exhibited information-seeking behaviours (Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkov 2010) 
are also increasingly information shaping. Sample and Karamanian (2014) noted the 
masculine tendency toward information dissemination with masculine countries’ adoption 
rates with Twitter usage. However, the movement into information shaping that appears, 
particularly with the use of Facebook, also reflects the evolution of the social media site. 
 
The PDI value increase is relevant because successful propaganda requires consistency and 
repetition (Gambrill 2010), behaviours that can be more easily supported in a high PDI 
society where orders are passed down from leadership (Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkov 2010). 
In the low PDI countries, where messages emanate from multiple sources, the content is more 
likely to vary due to individual preferences, which results in message variation. Nonetheless, 
some message variation may be acceptable in order to make the message appear authentic 
and the spread appear organic. The core message must be consistent, and this consistency fits 
well in a society where permission for all actions is strongly controlled. 
 
Conclusion 
The Bradshaw and Howard (2017) report provided an inventory of state-sponsored 
propaganda producers and distributors that used social media to further their goals. Since 
propaganda is designed for cognitive hacking, the attackers’ and targets’ values and beliefs 
should be understood. These values and beliefs may provide the insights necessary to make 
the message believable or trustworthy to the intended recipient. 
 
One aspect this study did not address is increasing the effectiveness of propaganda using 
psychological targeting. Matz et al. (2017) found that ads tailored to psychological traits, 
inferred personality characteristics using digital footprints from Facebook and other social 
media platforms, produced substantially more clicks and purchases than non-targeted ads. 
Others have disputed this finding as confounded due to targeted ads being higher in quality 
and more creative than non-targeted ads (Sharp, Danenberg & Bellman 2018). Another 
critique was that the targeting was confounded due to ad optimisation, since users were non-
randomly assigned to the ad types (Eckles, Gordon & Johnson 2018). Nevertheless, the 
capabilities for targeting specific users and groups of users will only improve, and tailored 
propaganda may be more effective than mass messaging. Unlike propaganda in the physical 
world, with social media there is minimal cost and time for tailoring messages and 
maximising the effectiveness of the digital propaganda using experiments. 
 
In the physical world, cultural values factor into believability and authenticity (Minkov 
2013); therefore, cultural values should similarly impact the evaluation of messages in the 
virtual world. A central goal of propaganda is to persuade the target. Thus, the message sent 
in support of propaganda must resonate with the intended recipient’s cultural values. 
 
Once propaganda has been successfully identified, effective countermeasures should be 
deployed. Although psychologically countering recipients of misinformation is challenging, 
there are evidence-based recommendations for doing so (decrease the number of arguments 
supporting the misinformation, create scrutiny and counter-arguments, and provide detailed 
corrections to misinformation) (Chan et al. 2017). Another approach is to carefully construct 
countermeasures to manipulate the purveyors. These responses will require an understanding 
of online trust relationships and purveyors’ values (cultural and psychological) in order to be 
 
 
effective. This study contributes to the overall process by focusing on the cultural values of 
countries that produce and disseminate propaganda. The cultural dimensions that were 
identified suggest that a direct response will be needed, but the response will likely require 
detailed, consistent, inconspicuous, and culturally tailored responses. 
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